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 Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Profes-
sors (“Amici”) respectfully submit this brief in support 
of the Petitioner.1 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 Amici, listed in Appendix A, are professors of law 
who research, write, and teach in the area of intellec-
tual property. Amici’s institutional affiliations are pro-
vided for identification purposes only, and imply no 
institutional endorsement of the views expressed 
herein. Amici have no personal stake in the outcome of 
this case. Counsel for all parties have consented to the 
filing of this brief. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 In its 1976 revision of the Copyright Act, Congress 
decided to separate applied art from industrial design, 
admitting the former to copyright and excluding the 
latter. It drew this distinction precisely because it in-
tended to differentiate copyright from design and util-
ity patent. Congress recognized as applied art only 
those aesthetic features of a useful article that could 
 
 1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amici Curiae affirm that no counsel 
for any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no coun-
sel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this brief. No person other than 
Amici or their counsel made a monetary contribution to its prep-
aration or submission. Counsel for both parties have consented to 
filing this brief. 
2 
 
be “separated” from that useful article rather than be-
ing integrated into the article.  
 The correct test of separability therefore consid-
ers conceptual separability to be nothing more than a 
coda to physical separability, and asks only whether 
the claimed design could be removed from the article 
and exist on its own as a pictorial, graphic or sculp-
tural work that is not a useful article. This test mini-
mizes the need for courts to make judgments about the 
aesthetic value of claimed features and the risk of an-
ticompetitive strike suits. And it preserves the distinc-
tion Congress meant to draw between applied art and 
industrial design.  
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 Congress made clear in the Copyright Act’s legis-
lative history its intent to distinguish applied art from 
industrial design, admitting the former to copyright 
protection, and excluding the latter. Focusing on Con-
gress’s distinction between applied art and industrial 
design is key to understanding how copyright’s useful 
articles doctrine works, and, in particular, how a court 
may properly determine whether some aesthetic fea-
ture of a useful article is “separable” from the article’s 
functional content and therefore protectable.  
 Courts should understand separability in terms of 
whether the claimed feature of a useful article (1) can 
be extracted from the article, even if doing so would 
destroy the article, and (2) once extracted, would stand 
3 
 
alone as an original pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
work (PGS work) that is not a useful article. Features 
of useful articles that meet this test are properly clas-
sified as “applied art” – i.e., artistic content that has 
been “applied” to a useful article, a category of subject 
matter which, as this Court has previously held and 
Congress affirmed, does not lose its copyrightability by 
virtue of its application to a useful article. See Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 Courts in recent years have abstracted away 
from the distinction Congress intended and often have 
attempted to determine separability by inquiring 
whether the designer of a useful article was making 
aesthetic choices relatively unconstrained by function. 
See Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 
F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Conceptual separability 
exists . . . when the artistic aspects of an article can 
be conceptualized as existing independently of their 
utilitarian function. This independence is necessarily 
informed by whether the design elements can be iden-
tified as reflecting the designer’s artistic judgment 
exercised independently of functional influences.”) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); 
Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 
1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987). But that test has proven so 
difficult to apply that even when courts agree on the 
test, judges often disagree on the outcome of that test 
applied to particular cases. Indeed, that happened in 
this very case. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, 
L.L.C., 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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 The disagreement is not surprising; judges are 
not experts in design, and courts are neither well- 
positioned to understand the fine points of the design 
process for useful articles, nor to make judgments 
about the degree to which aesthetic choices are con-
strained by an article’s function. Congress wisely did 
not invite such an inquiry. 
 
I. Industrial Design v. Applied Art 
 In 1976, Congress replaced “works of art” as a cat-
egory of copyrightable subject matter with “pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(5). The 
scope of this new category of copyrightable subject 
matter was then qualified with respect to the use of 
PGS works in “useful articles”:  
[PGS works] shall include works of artistic 
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not 
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned; the design of a useful article, as de-
fined in this section, shall be considered a pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and 
only to the extent that, such design incorpo-
rates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features 
that can be identified separately from, and are 
capable of existing independently of, the utili-
tarian aspects of the article. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  
 According to the Copyright Act’s legislative his-
tory, the statutory language dealing with useful arti-
cles was “drawn from Copyright Office Regulations 
promulgated in the 1940’s,” as well as language added 
to those regulations in the 1950’s to implement this 
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Court’s decision in Mazer, 347 U.S. 201. H.R. Rep. No. 
94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659. According to those implementing regulations:  
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its 
utility, the fact that it is unique and attrac-
tively shaped will not qualify it as a [copy-
rightable] work of art. However, if the shape 
of a utilitarian article incorporates features, 
such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial 
representation, which can be identified sepa-
rately and are capable of existing inde-
pendently as a work of art, such features will 
be eligible for [copyright].  
37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959). The new statutory lan-
guage of the 1976 Act was intended “to draw as clear a 
line as possible between copyrightable works of ap-
plied art and uncopyrightable works of industrial de-
sign.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55. As the House 
Report explained:  
The Committee has added language to the 
definition of ‘pictorial, graphic, and sculptural 
works’ in an effort to make clearer the distinc-
tion between works of applied art protectable 
under the bill and industrial designs not sub-
ject to copyright protection. . . .  
Id. at 62-63. Thus, it is beyond peradventure Congress 
did not want to transform copyright law into a general 
industrial design protection system.2  
 
 2 Indeed, while separate protection for industrial design has 
been repeatedly proposed, Congress always declined to add it to  
6 
 
 The statute draws the line between applied art 
and industrial design first by requiring a determina-
tion of whether the object at issue is a “useful article.” 
The statutory definition of “useful articles” is broad, 
encompassing all articles “having an intrinsic utilitar-
ian function that is not merely to portray the appear-
ance of the article or to convey information.” 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (emphasis added).3 For articles with any such in-
trinsic utilitarian function, the statute requires a sec-
ond inquiry into the separability of any aesthetic 
features of the article.  
 
II. The Separability Test 
 Elaborating on its understanding of separability, 
the House Report said that “[a] two-dimensional paint-
ing, drawing, or graphic work is still capable of being 
identified as such when it is printed on or applied to 
utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics, wallpaper, 
containers, and the like. The same is true when a 
statue or carving is used to embellish an industrial 
product or, as in the Mazer case, is incorporated into a 
 
the Copyright Act. See Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enter-
prises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1446-47 (3d Cir. 1994) (recounting the 
history of congressional rejection); In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 
1214, 1219 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Rich, J., concurring) (explaining that 
design protection was initially included in the 1976 Act, but “was 
jettisoned to facilitate passage of the main bill”). 
 3 Congress expanded the definition of “useful article” with 
this language, broadening the former language, “sole utilitarian 
function.” See Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case 
Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-
Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 730-32 (1984). 
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product without losing its ability to exist independ-
ently as a work of art.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55. 
 By contrast, “although the shape of an industrial 
product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable, 
the Committee’s intention [was] not to offer it copy-
right protection under the bill.” Id. Thus, “[u]nless the 
shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, food 
processor, television set, or any other industrial prod-
uct contains some element that, physically or con- 
ceptually, can be identified as separable from the 
utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not 
be copyrighted. . . .” Id. 
 As the House Report makes clear, aesthetic fea-
tures are separable under this approach if they can 
have a separate existence as a copyrightable work 
apart from the useful article to which they have been 
applied. The “over-all configuration,” id., of a useful ar-
ticle is simply not protectable under any circum-
stances; Congress protected sculptural works applied 
to lamps, not lamps. It is irrelevant to Congress’s 
distinction whether the features could have been de-
signed differently or whether they were designed “in-
dependently” of functional considerations. Cf. Brandir, 
834 F.2d at 1145. “[I]ndependence from ‘the utilitarian 
aspects of the article’ does not depend upon the nature 
of the design – that is, even if the appearance of an ar-
ticle is determined by esthetic (as opposed to func-
tional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can 
be identified separately from the useful article as such 
are copyrightable.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55 (em-
phasis added).  
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 The examples of features Congress considered 
separable under this standard – “a carving on the back 
of a chair” and “a floral relief design on silver flatware” 
– all follow a common theme. Id. Congress clearly 
meant to protect features of useful articles that could 
exist as a separate copyrightable work in some other 
medium. The further examples included by the Copy-
right Office in its Compendium of U.S. Copyright Prac-
tices – “[a]n engraving on a vase,” “[a]rtwork printed 
on a t-shirt,” “[a] colorful pattern decorating the sur-
face of a shopping bag,” “[a] drawing on the surface of 
wallpaper,” and “[a] floral relief decorating the handle 
of a spoon” – follow this theme as well. COMPENDIUM OF 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES III § 924.2(B) (2014). 
Conversely, Congress meant to exclude from copyright 
protection features that are integrated into a work of 
industrial design and make sense only as part of that 
useful article.  
 This understanding allows courts to apprehend 
and follow the statutory command that copyrightable 
features of useful articles are limited to “features that 
can be identified separately from, and are capable of 
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the 
article.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). Aesthetic 
features of a useful article are “capable” of existing sep-
arately if they can be removed or extracted from the 
useful article and the removed design would constitute 
a PGS work, but not the design of a useful article. This 
understanding also makes clear that courts have sub-
stantially overcomplicated so-called “conceptual” sepa-
rability. Conceptual separability is not terra incognita 
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or some invitation for courts to develop their own the-
ory of what is art versus function. It is, rather, a modest 
extension of the concept of physical separability, the 
other category that Congress specified in the Copy-
right Act’s legislative history.  
 Physical separability is found, for example, in an 
epaulet that is sewn onto the shoulder of a jacket and 
that may be readily removed without destroying the 
jacket. “Conceptual” separability is closely related: it is 
no more than separability that could not, in actual fact, 
be carried out physically without destroying the under-
lying useful article – an example would be a graphic 
design on an epaulet printed onto the shoulder of the 
same jacket. Conceptual separability is a kind of coda 
to physical separability.  
 Stated another way: if one could extract the 
claimed features and use them on their own in another 
context without replicating the useful article of which 
they are part, and the result would be a copyrightable 
PGS work standing alone, then there is separable mat-
ter. On the other hand, if extracting the claimed fea-
tures would necessarily bring along the underlying 
useful article, the design is inseparable from the useful 
article. For example, an artistic design printed onto a 
poster, and then veneered onto the back of a chair, 
might be separable in the ordinary physical sense. The 
same artistic design carved into the back of the chair 
might not actually be removable without destroying 
the chair. That design is nonetheless separable “con-
ceptually,” for the same reason the design printed on 
the poster is: the work would be the same work as a 
10 
 
design on paper – a copyrightable graphic work. It 
therefore is capable of an independent existence apart 
from the underlying useful article. Likewise, the plas-
ter-of-Paris sculpture encasing the electrical cords and 
wiring in the lamp in Mazer v. Stein could not be phys-
ically separated from the cords and wiring without de-
stroying the lamp (because of the materials from which 
it was made), but the sculpture standing on its own 
was not a lamp: it was a conceptually separable sculp-
tural work. See Mazer, 347 U.S. 201.4  
 The test we propose faithfully implements Con-
gress’s intent. The House Report states that “a two- 
dimensional painting, drawing, or graphic work is still 
capable of being identified as such when it is printed 
on or applied to utilitarian articles such as textile fab-
rics, wallpaper, containers, and the like,” and that 
“[t]he same is true when a statue or carving is used to 
embellish an industrial product or, as in the Mazer 
case, is incorporated into a product without losing its 
ability to exist independently as a work of art.” H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 62-63. This statement is con-
sistent in its entirety with the test Amici propose. 
 
 
 4 One possible way to characterize the test Amici offer is that 
courts should ignore the physical integrity of the underlying use-
ful article in assessing separability. As indicated by the list of rep-
resentative examples Congress offered, it is the impossibility of 
removing some applied art without destroying the underlying ob-
ject that led Congress to add “conceptual” separability, to make 
clear that the useful article need not be preserved post-separation 
for “separability” to exist. 
11 
 
III. Separability Offers a Clear Way to Under-
stand Most Useful Article Cases 
 Many older cases express a clear understanding of 
the close connection between physical and conceptual 
separability. Compare Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (denying copyright protection 
to design of street lights), with Royalty Designs v. 
Thrifticheck Service Corp., 204 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962) (finding copyrightable a coin bank shaped like a 
dog, where shape was original), and Ted Arnold Ltd. v. 
Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (find-
ing copyrightable the design of a pencil sharpener in 
the shape of an old-fashioned telephone that was not a 
copy of any real telephone).5 As the courts have made 
separability more complicated and contestable, plain-
tiffs have brought more extreme cases, reflecting the 
litigation-generating effect of standards that are both 
broad and unpredictable. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14 (2000) (noting 
that anticompetitive suits are facilitated by unclear 
tests and that “[c]ompetition is deterred . . . not merely 
by successful suit but by the plausible threat of suc-
cessful suit,” justifying rules that are as bright-line as 
possible). 
 
 5 As noted below, copyrightable elements are limited to the 
creativity added by the creator, and also subject to the originality 
and merger doctrines. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 
486, 489 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that a copy of a public domain 
bank was not independently copyrightable because changes were 
made for functional, not creative, reasons). 
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 By focusing on separability, Amici’s proposed test 
offers a simpler path to correct results. In Universal 
Furniture Intern., Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 
618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010), the court correctly found 
that the designs engraved into plaintiff ’s furniture 
were separable, although its reasoning conflated the 
question of aesthetics with that of protectability. See 
id. at 423 (finding separability because the purpose 
of carving the designs “was entirely aesthetic,” even 
though the artist was also “influenced by function” in 
designing the elements; nonetheless, the court thought 
it faced a “metaphysical quandary” because “[t]he ele-
ments serve no purpose divorced from the furniture – 
they become designs in space”). Under our proposed 
analysis, the separability of engraved ornamental de-
signs is clear.  
 The result in Home Legend, LLC v. Mannington 
Mills, Inc., 784 F.3d 1404 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding 
designs on laminated floor tiles physically and concep-
tually separable), is also consistent with our test, al- 
though the Eleventh Circuit made the case more 
difficult by asking whether the design was separately 
marketable in order to determine whether it was sep-
arable. There is probably no real market for pictures of 
wood grain. But just as aesthetic merit is not an appro-
priate inquiry for courts, neither is whether a creative 
work has a market waiting for it. The appropriate 
question is whether the design could stand alone as a 
work, not whether the work would have a market. 
 Similarly, Bonazoli v. R.S.V.P. Intern., Inc., 353 
F. Supp. 2d 218 (D.R.I. 2005), the court correctly found 
13 
 
that the design features of measuring spoons shaped 
like heart-tipped arrows were not separable, because 
replicating the design would necessarily produce 
measuring spoons, which are useful articles.  
 
 See also Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Cinderella Divine, 
Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (prom dress 
design lacked separability), aff ’d sub nom. Jovani 
Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 500 Fed. App’x 42 (2d 
Cir. 2012); Magnussen Furniture, Inc. v. Collezione 
Europa USA, Inc., 116 F.3d 472 (4th Cir. 1997) (table 
design features were not separable). 
 In Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 
1038 (9th Cir. 2014), the Ninth Circuit properly held 
that the overall shape of a useful article is not copy-
rightable no matter how aesthetically pleasing that 
shape may be. See id. at 1042 (holding that although 
14 
 
Inhale’s water container, like a piece of modern sculp-
ture, has a distinctive shape, “[t]he shape of the alleged 
‘artistic features’ and of the useful article are one and 
the same.”). See also Esquire, 591 F.2d at 804 (noting 
that the legislative history indicates “unequivocally 
that the overall design or configuration of a utilitarian 
object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as 
functional considerations, is not eligible for copy-
right”). Our proposed test implements this result. Any 
replica of the overall shape would replicate the useful 
article (even if it would not function because, for ex- 
ample, it was made out of different material). See also 
Norris Industries, Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 
696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983) (no protection for wire-
spoked wheel cover).  
 
 Nor can inseparability be avoided by defining the 
claimed design to be only a portion of a useful article. 
For example, in Eliya, Inc. v. Kohl’s Dept. Stores, No. 06 
Civ. 195(GEL), 2006 WL 2645196 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the 
plaintiff claimed protection for the stitching and sole 
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patterns on a shoe; the court properly found lack of 
separability. Even in the abstract and without other 
material present, the configuration of the stitching and 
patterns on the sole still defined a shoe. If abstracted 
away from the shape of a shoe, moreover, the only thing 
remaining would be unoriginal circles and stitches. By 
attending to the fact that three-dimensional designs 
regularly depend on three-dimensional relationships 
between elements, copyright’s originality requirement 
can thus police against attempts to game the separa-
bility standard by claiming only portions of an article. 
 
IV. Separability Channels Industrial Design 
to Design Patent 
 Excluding inseparable features does not leave de-
sign without protection. Instead, the union of form and 
function can readily be protected through the law of 
design patent, as Congress intended. See Mark P. 
McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress & Com-
petition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 48-51 
(2013) (focusing on the integration of form and func-
tion to define design patent subject matter).  
 This distinction between the protection offered by 
design patent and the protection offered by copyright 
corresponds to the simple conceptual separability test 
outlined above. Moreover, it allows the Court to more 
easily distinguish between works of applied art and 
works of industrial design without resorting, as the 
lower courts have, to some detailed theory of how 
to separate art from function. If the claimed subject 
matter is integrated into the design of the useful 
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article or the part of the useful article which the sub-
ject matter comprises, then the claimed subject matter 
is a work of industrial design, and protectable, if at all, 
by design patent. This is true even though industrial 
designs, like copyrightable works, have aesthetic qual-
ities and might be perceived as “art” by patrons 
thereof.6 The idea of separability, in other words, is the 
removal of something from the useful article – which 
necessarily implies that the separable features must 
be less than the whole. The mere fact that the useful 
article can be appreciated aesthetically says nothing 
about whether the design is separable.  
 Neither are features separable simply because 
they are aesthetic; if that were the test, then the only 
useful articles that would be unprotected by copyright 
would be those without any attractive features. But 
(nearly) all industrial design is a mix of aesthetic 
and functional. The Copyright Act reaches industrial 
design only insofar as the pictorial, graphic or sculp-
tural content of a particular useful article may exist 
without the underlying article. To the extent this test 
is met, then that PGS feature is copyrightable as a 
work of applied art.  
 
 6 The United States recently joined the Hague Agreement. 
See Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-211, 
126 Stat. 1527 (2012). In implementing it, the U.S. decided to 
channel foreign industrial design applications to the design pat-
ent system. See 35 U.S.C. § 385 (“An international design applica-
tion designating the United States shall have the effect, for all 
purposes, from its filing date determined in accordance with sec-
tion 384, of an application for patent filed in the Patent and Trade-
mark Office pursuant to chapter 16.”). This decision bolsters the 
argument that copyright is the wrong home for industrial design.  
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 The application of this analysis to the design of 
cheerleader uniforms or other clothing designs is sim-
ple and clear: the aesthetic elements of a cheerleader 
uniform exist only as part of a cheerleader uniform. 
There is nothing to extract; the claimant claims the de-
sign of a useful article. By contrast, a fabric print 
would be the same artwork if it were on a notebook 
cover, wallpaper, or other surface.  
 The claimant here could, using an analogy to fab-
ric prints, claim only the chevrons and not the coordi-
nation and arrangement thereof, which constitute the 
cut of the garment. But that is not what the claimant as-
serts, likely because the chevrons themselves are stan- 
dard uniform elements that lack the minimal spark nec-
essary for copyrightability. Cf. Design Ideas, Ltd. v. Yan-
kee Candle Co., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (C.D. Ill. 2012) 
(finding that candle holders in the generalized shape of 
sailboats were probably not separable, but definitely not 
creative enough for copyright protection). 
 
See also Eliya, 2006 WL 2645196 (similar result for de-
sign on outside of shoe). 
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 This analysis highlights an important point: sepa-
rability is part of a larger scheme, in which multiple 
doctrines have roles to play. The originality, idea/ 
expression, and merger doctrines limit the copyright- 
ability of all creative works. Section 113(b) of the Copy-
right Act is of particular import here. Section 113(b) 
provides that a copyright in a work depicting a useful 
article does not extend to the manufacture, distribu-
tion, or display of that useful article. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b); 
see, e.g., Forest River, Inc. v. Heartland Recreational Ve-
hicles, LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759-60 (N.D. Ind. 
2010) (applying § 113(b)); William F. Patry, Patry on 
Copyright § 11:13 (2016) (“[C]opyright in a drawing of 
a boiler, cabinet, or automobile would not prohibit un-
authorized manufacture from drawings of those ob-
jects.”) (footnote omitted).  
 Thus, drawings or photographs of the uniform de-
signs at issue, like drawings or photographs of any 
other real-world objects, are copyrightable to the ex-
tent that they evince creativity, but they could not be 
asserted against the making of the underlying useful 
articles. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 
111 U.S. 53 (1884); see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 
at 105 (explaining that the purpose of § 113(b) was to 
preserve the principle that “copyright in a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work, portraying a useful article 
as such, does not extend to the manufacture of the use-
ful article itself ”). 
 Section 113(b) and separability are two sides of 
the same coin, working together to solve the problems 
caused by excluding industrial design from copyright. 
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Patry, supra § 11:12 (“Both section 113(b) and the sep-
arability test for protection are designed to address 
this conundrum [when the plaintiff ’s work depicts a 
useful article].”). With the combination of separability 
and § 113(b), one cannot claim copyright in a useful ar-
ticle by putting it on a necklace and wearing it as jew-
elry, no matter how aesthetic the effect: 
 
ArmageddonArt, Real .223 Bullet Necklace with 24 
Inch Chain, Etsy, (last modified July 2, 2016).7 
 Likewise, an artist cannot draw a design or carve 
a sculpture for a new bullet, no matter how beautiful, 
and get a claim over the resulting useful article. Cf. 
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (“The copyright 
 
 7 https://www.etsy.com/listing/104890409/real-223-bullet-necklace- 
with-24-inch. 
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of a book on perspective, no matter how many draw-
ings and illustrations it may contain, gives no exclu-
sive right to the modes of drawing described, though 
they may never have been known or used before.”); J.H. 
Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign 
Copyright Law: From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1207-08 
(1983) (explaining the derivation of § 113(b) from 
Baker). The artist’s copyright is limited to the original 
elements of the PGS work depicting the useful article, 
preserving her copyright interest in the art market 
without interfering with the market for useful articles. 
Cf. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147 (finding design of a bike 
rack inseparable from its status as a bike rack, while 
sculpture that looked like a bike rack, or a bike, could 
be copyrightable if original).  
 For this reason, hypotheticals involving useful ar-
ticles rendered in different sizes or materials – such as 
a toy-sized uniform or a chair made out of tissue paper 
– are inappropriate for determining whether the aes-
thetic features of the design that the claimant actually 
made are separable.8 If we allow imaginary manipula-
tions of the physicality of the article, no useful article 
would ever be excluded from copyright, because at 
some scale or in some material the utility of any arti-
cle, or of any feature of an article, can be removed. The 
fact that sculptures could be, and in fact have been, 
 
 8 The question of whether toys are themselves useful articles 
is a difficult one, but one this Court need not decide, since no toys 
are involved here. 
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designed to look like sailboats does not mean that sail-
boats are not useful articles.  
 In sum, Amici’s proposed test offers a relatively 
simple way to distinguish applied art from industrial 
design, and thereby to distinguish separable from in-
separable PGS features of useful articles. That said, no 
test will apply with perfect clarity to all cases. Because 
of the inevitable fuzziness in practice, the related risk 
of oppressive and anticompetitive threats of suit, and 
the availability of design patent protection for useful 
articles, Amici suggest that the Court apply its well-
grounded reasoning in Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 215: in 
cases of doubt, a court should find that the claimed 
matter is industrial design and therefore not separa-
ble.  
 
V. Other Approaches to Separability and Their 
Problems 
 The chaos in the courts of appeals and the exten-
sive body of commentary on separability indicate that 
current approaches have largely failed to produce rules 
that courts can apply consistently; only our approach 
offers a simple way out, grounded in the statute. In 
contrast to this straightforward account of conceptual 
separability – one that is consistent with the text of the 
Copyright Act and Congress’s intent as expressed in 
the Act’s legislative history – the various incompatible 
tests currently employed by courts try to do something 
that is conceptually intractable, which is to separate 
protectable art from unprotectable functionality. Thus, 
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many courts have articulated tests of conceptual sepa-
rability that focus on whether particular features were 
determined by aesthetic rather than functional consid-
erations. See Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 931 (collecting 
cases).  
 That approach faces two insurmountable prob-
lems. First, it puts the law at odds with the subject 
matter the law is regulating. Indeed, it is often ob-
served that modern designers think of what they do in 
terms of the integration of form and function – that is, 
as the opposite of separability. Frank Lloyd Wright, 
The Future of Architecture 296 (1953) (“Form and func-
tion are one.”); see also Viva R. Moffat, The Copy-
right/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 611, 660 
(2014) (“The very best industrial design will seam-
lessly integrate form and function.”); Brett S. Sylvester, 
The Future of Design Protection in the United States, 
20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 261, 271 (1986) (“[T]he majority 
of modern industrial designs are heavily influenced by 
the Bauhaus approach to design which stresses the 
unification of form and function.”). 
 Second, it runs squarely against Congress’s intent 
by putting courts in the role of art theorists separating 
the aesthetic from the functional. The relatively sim-
pler separability analysis outlined above allows courts 
to distinguish separable (and therefore copyrightable) 
applied art from inseparable elements of industrial de-
sign, however aesthetically pleasing. Reichman, 1983 
DUKE L.J. at 1261-62 (explaining that the definition 
of PGS works was intended to channel cases away 
from copyright and into separate industrial design 
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legislation, which was then removed from the final 
bill). Congress defined PGS works as it did because it 
wanted to differentiate the domain of copyright from 
that of design patent, the legal regime that protects the 
ornamental, aesthetic features of industrial design. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54. 
 Courts’ attempts to differentiate aesthetics and 
function has led them astray in a number of cases. The 
features of the belt buckle in Kieselstein-Cord could not 
be replicated without replicating a belt buckle. The 
court was therefore wrong to find conceptual separa-
bility just because the belt buckle could be used (as a 
whole) as jewelry. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by 
Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (“We see in 
appellant’s belt buckles conceptually separable sculp-
tural elements, as apparently have the buckles’ wear-
ers who have used them as ornamentation for parts of 
the body other than the waist.”). 
 Kieselstein-Cord got the distinction wrong because 
the court asked whether the article could be used in 
some other, nonutilitarian context rather than asking 
whether any features of the article could have a sepa-
rate existence. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993. In 
other words, Kieselstein-Cord mistakenly conflated 
separability with the question of whether the buckle 
would be useful in any context in which it was put 
(which, of course, no useful article is). Putting a urinal 
in a museum was art, at least when Duchamp did it; 
that does not mean the urinal was copyrightable. Like-
wise, exhibiting a buckle in an art museum, or wearing 
it around one’s neck, does not make the design of the 
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buckle separable from the buckle itself.9 There may be 
thirteen (or more) ways of looking at a belt buckle, but 
the buckle itself remains a buckle.  
 In Carol Barnhart, the court considered whether 
the aesthetic and artistic features were separable from 
the forms’ use as utilitarian articles (torsos for display-
ing clothing). Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover 
Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). Judge Newman, in 
dissent, would have asked whether the article “stimu-
late[s] in the mind” of the “ordinary, reasonable ob-
server” “a concept that is separate from the concept 
evoked by its utilitarian function.” Carol Barnhart, 773 
F.2d at 422 (Newman, J., dissenting). This is the over-
complicated conceptual fallacy discussed above: the 
question is not whether one can look at a urinal, or a 
Porsche, and see art. The legislative history of the 1976 
Act explains that the definition of “ ‘pictorial, graphic, 
and sculptural works’ carries with it no implied crite-
rion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic qual-
ity.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 55. The question is 
whether features of the Porsche could have a separate 
existence as a work. And clearly they cannot. Neither 
could the torso forms in Carol Barnhart.10  
 
 9 Design patent, however, would remain available for any 
similar novel design that was timely registered.  
 10 It is also important to remember that significant work 
takes place at the stage of identifying what is a “useful article” as 
well. Ordinarily, sculptures are not useful articles, though people 
can hang clothes (or lampshades) on them. Again, the Court is not 
asked here to articulate a test for determining in every case what 
a “useful article” is. If the Court asks separability to do too much 
of the definitional work for which originality, the scope of “useful  
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 Another Second Circuit panel in Brandir as well 
as a Seventh Circuit panel in Pivot Point focused on 
the designer’s intention in creating the work, holding 
that copyrightability “should depend on the extent to 
which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited 
by functional considerations.” Brandir, 834 F.2d at 
1145 (quoting Robert Denicola, Applied Art and Indus-
trial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in 
Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741-45 (1983)); 
see also Pivot Point, 372 F.3d at 926-27 (adopting 
Brandir/Denicola test). This approach is directly con-
trary to congressional guidance in the legislative his-
tory, which made clear that the fact that features 
were developed for aesthetic reasons independent of 
function did not make them separable. H.R. Rep. No. 
94-1476, at 55 (emphasizing Congress’s intention to  
exclude industrial design that was “aesthetically satis-
fying and valuable” from copyright).  
 Finally, the Fifth Circuit in Galiano asked whether 
claimed copyrightable aspects of the work are them-
selves “marketable to some significant segment of the 
community.” Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 
F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005). Again, the court’s test 
wrongly collapses separability into artistic quality. 
Highly marketable, beautiful designs are protectable 
by design patent; artistic works for which there is no 
market are protectable by copyright. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
article,” and other doctrines are better suited, it risks continuing 
the incoherence and struggle that produced the present mish-
mash of cases. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Congress decided to separate industrial design 
from applied art, leaving industrial design protectable, 
if at all, only through utility patent or design patent. 
To protect this distinction and limit the coverage of 
copyright to applied art, the Court should adopt the 
simplest possible test for separability, one that mini-
mizes the need for courts to make aesthetic judgments 
and the risk of anticompetitive strike suits. A test that 
considers conceptual separability to be a coda to phys-
ical separability, and therefore asks only whether the 
claimed design could be removed from the article and 
have an existence as a PGS work, or whether instead 
the claimed design is the article (or part thereof ), is the 
best approach.  
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